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This paper examines the dynamic linkages between real estate investment trusts (REITs), 
which are a proxy for investment in real estate, interest rates and stock prices in Malaysia 
over  the  period  2006  to  2009.  Two  mechanisms  have  been  proposed  to  interpret  the 
relationship between investment in real estate and stocks. The first is the wealth effect, which 
states that investors with unanticipated gains in share prices will invest in real estate. The 
second is the credit-price effect, which states that if real estate prices increase, firms holding 
commercial real estate will have large unrealized capital gains, meaning that investors will 
bid up the equity value of the firm. This suggests that the housing market will lead the stock 
market. Over the period 2006 to 2009, real estate and stock prices have surged in tandem in 
Malaysia. We find evidence of a wealth effect in the short-run, while in the long-run for some 
REITs we find support for the wealth effect, while for others we find evidence of feedback 
effects between real estate and stocks. This finding is consistent with a spiralling upturn in 
both prices and provides support for both effects operating together. The results lend support 
to concerns that the Malaysian real estate market is characterized by an asset bubble and that 
a decline in the stock market could burst the Malaysian real estate bubble. 
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REITs, interest rates and stock prices in Malaysia 
Introduction 
Housing and stocks can be considered as investment alternatives. Both real estate and stocks 
are often important assets in many investors‟ portfolios. Several authors have argued that 
commercial real estate offers diversification benefits to institutional investors because of its 
low correlation with commonly used stock price indices (see Quan & Titman, 1999). Two 
mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to interpret the relationship between real 
estate prices and stock prices (Kapopoulos & Siokis, 2005). The first is the wealth effect. The 
wealth effect suggests that households with unanticipated gains in share prices will increase 
the amount of housing. Hence, the stock market will lead the housing market. This will occur 
through two channels  because housing is  both  a consumption and investment  good. One 
channel is that an increase in share market wealth will result in an increase in aggregate 
consumption.  The  other  channel  is  through  investment  portfolio  adjustment.  When  share 
prices increase, the share of households‟ portfolios in the stock market will increase and 
households will seek to rebalance their portfolios through selling stocks and purchasing other 
assets, including housing (Markowitz, 1952). The second mechanism linking housing and 
stock prices is the credit-price effect, which focuses attention on the balance sheet position 
and collateral value of credit constrained firms. Since commercial and residential property 
can act as collateral for loans, when real estate prices increase, credit constrained firms are 
able to borrow more for investments. The credit-price effect tends to suggest that the housing 
market will lead the stock market because firms holding commercial real estate will have 
large unrealized capital gains that will mean that investors will bid up the equity value of the 
firm.  However,  since  firms  demand  more  land  and  buildings  to  carry  out  expanded 
investment,  the  price  of  commercial,  as  well  as  residential,  property  will  also  increase, 2 
 
suggesting an upward spiral in both property and stock prices and persistent feedback effects. 
Feedback effects between the two markets are consistent with the existence of both effects. 
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between real estate prices and stock prices. 
Most of the early studies were for the United Kingdom or the United States and focused on 
correlations between the two assets returns (see eg. Ibbotson & Siegel, 1984; Hartzell, 1986; 
Worzala & Vandell, 1993;  Eichholtz & Hartzell, 1996). Most of these studies  found the 
correlation between housing and stock returns to be negative. However, none of these studies 
provide  any  indication  as  to  whether  the  credit-price  or  wealth  effects  are  in  operation 
because no inference can be made about the direction of causation. More recent studies have 
applied  cointegration  and  Granger  causality  to  time  series  data  to  examine  the  causal 
interactions between housing and stock prices. These studies include Chen (2001) – Taiwan; 
Sutton (2002) – Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Ireland and Netherlands; 
Green (2002) – four geographic locales in California with different housing prices; Kakes and 
Van den End (2004) – Netherlands; Kapopoulos and Siokis (2005) – Greece; Sim and Chang 
(2006)  –  South  Korea;  Ansari  (2006)  –  United  States;  and  Ibrahim  (2010)  –  Thailand. 
Overall, Ansari (2006) and Sim and Chang (2006) found support for the credit-price effect. 
Each of the other studies, though, found support for the existence of a wealth effect. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between the real estate 
market and stock market for Malaysia. To this point most studies have focused on advanced 
markets and there are few studies of the dynamic linkages between real estate and stock 
markets for developing markets. Malaysia has experienced a relatively high rate of economic 
growth. Between 2006 and 2009, Malaysia‟s economic growth averaged just under 6 per 
cent. Housing prices and stock prices peaked prior to the United States sub-prime crisis. Both 3 
 
fell in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis, but both housing prices and stock prices have 
strongly rebounded in parallel following the crisis. Stock prices in Malaysia increased prior to 
the United States sub-prime crisis. The Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) finished 
2007 on 1,445 points, up from 1,096 points at the end 0f 2006 (World Bank, 2008). Stock 
prices  fell  in  the aftermath  of the sub-prime  crisis. On March 10, 2008 alone the  KLCI 
dropped 9.5 per cent (World Bank, 2008). However, since the sub-prime crisis, the KLCI has 
rebounded strongly. In December 2009, the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) was 45 
per cent higher than its lowest point of 838 points in March 2009 (Raj, 2010).  
 
In the period since the sub-prime crisis in the United States, housing prices have increased 
sharply, particularly in Kuala Lumpur, the Klang Valley and Penang. To illustrate, a terrace 
house in  the Klang Valley  sold  for about RM400,000  in  2008, but in  2010 it cost  over 
RM700,000. In 2010, semi-detached and detached houses in the Klang Valley sold for more 
than RM2 million.
1  In 2010, Penang new condominiums sold for RM600 to RM700  per 
square metre, semi-detached houses and terraced houses with some land were selling for 
more than RM1 million and bungalows from RM3.5 million to RM4 million (Ng, 2010).  
 
There are several reasons for the increase in housing prices (Ng, 2010). First,  there has been 
an increase in foreign acquisition of property in Malaysia. This trend has been encouraged by 
government policies promoting foreign ownership of property (such as the „my second home 
program‟). Second, there has been substantial property development with low entry costs for 
new home owners (property developers are allowing down payments of 5-10 per cent). Third, 
there have been a range of flexible mortgages available coupled with low interest rates to 
                                                           
1 ‘A real estate bubble’ <Mysinchew.com> 15 May 2010 (last accessed 19 July, 2010). 4 
 
stimulate economic growth, following the sub-prime crisis. Fourth, Malaysia is a developing 
country  which  has  undergone  rapid  urbanisation  as  a  result  of  structural  change  in  the 
economy. The urbanisation rate was 38.8 per cent in 1980 before almost doubling to 62 per 
cent in 2000 and 66.9 per cent in 2005 (Jaafar, 2004). Such trends create excess demand for 
housing and push up prices (Hui, 2009). Fifth, demographic statistics from Ng (2006) suggest 
that population in Malaysia consists of a much larger number of working adults than retirees. 
Over 60 per cent of the population are in the age group of 15-64, while less than 5 per cent of 
the population are over 65. This implies that a bigger pool of first-time buyers and up-graders 
exists relative to the pool of households trading down, which push prices up (Hui, 2009). 
Sixth, the Malaysian government‟s economic development strategy is contributing to higher 
prices in some areas as it rezones land. For example, in 2010 it was announced that the 
Malaysian government and the Employee Provident Fund will form a joint venture to develop 
a 3000 acre tract of land in Sungai Buloh into a new hub for the Klang Valley.
2  
 
There is evidence of speculation in housing markets. This has created fears of an asset bubble 
in the housing market.
3 The surge in housing prices and stock markets following the sub-
prime crisis is also apparent in other parts of Asia. The value of major stock indices in China, 
India and Indonesia doubled in 2009, while property prices in major regional centres, such as 
Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore, experienced substantial growth throughout 2009. As a 
result, property prices in many Asian countries were nearing previous highs and many Asian 
asset markets are being characterized in terms of bubbles (Bryson & Kamaruddin, 2010). 
 
                                                           
2 ‘A real estate bubble’ <Mysinchew.com> 15 May 2010 (last accessed 19 July, 2010). 
3 ‘A real estate bubble’ <Mysinchew.com> 15 May 2010 (last accessed 19 July, 2010). 5 
 
The parallel surge in housing and stock prices in Malaysia since the sub-prime crisis raises 
the issue of whether there is a long-run relationship between the two variables and, if so, is 
there a credit-price or wealth effect driving the long-run relationship between the variables. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REIT), stock prices and interest rates in Malaysia. Reliable data on direct investment 
in real estate is not available. However, one can indirectly trade real estate through REITs. 
REITs  have  two  defining  characteristics;  their  primary  business  is  managing  groups  of 
income-producing  properties  and  they  distribute  most  of  their  profits  as  dividends  to 
shareholders.  Generally  REITs  distribute  90  per  cent  of  taxable  profits  as  dividends.  In 
contrast to unit trusts, REITs are actively traded on stock exchanges and form an avenue for 
exploring the linkages between stock and real estate investments (Surahmanyam, 2007).  
 
The strength of the causal relationship between housing and stock prices will depend on the 
extent  to  which  purchasing  real  estate  is  considered  an  investment  (Ansari,  2006).  As 
mentioned  above,  the  Malaysian  government  is  keen  to  attract  more  foreign  property 
investors, particularly from India, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Malaysia‟s Foreign 
Investment Committee has deregulated investment guidelines with a view to making it easier 
for  foreigners  to  purchase  property.  To  this  point,  foreign  investors  from  India,  Korea, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom have been the biggest investors in the country, investing 
on average US$150,000 to US$300,000 with Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Johor the most 
popular destinations.
4 REITs are  considered a new sector on the  Malaysian stock market 
compared to their presence in developed markets. In December 2009, Malaysia's REITs had a 
market  capitalization  of  US$1540  million,  which  was  less  than  market  capitalization  in 
Singapore and Hong Kong where the corresponding figures were  US$20617 million and 
                                                           
4 ‘Malaysia keen to attract overseas property investors as analysts predict steady real estate recovery‟ 
<http://www.propertywire.com/news/asia/malaysia/real-estate market> (last accessed 19 July, 2010). 6 
 
US$9521 million respectively.
5 There are not many REITs listed in Bursa Malaysia and the 
trade volume is low. Many are under priced. However,  investors believe that REITs  are 
profitable with good prospects and with housing prices booming, coupled with relatively low 
interest rates, Bursa Malaysia has been promoting REIT to investors. 
 
Consistent with the recent literature on this topic, we employ a unit root, cointegration and 
Granger causality testing framework. Because the housing and stock market s have  been 
potentially subject to a major structural break in the form of the sub -prime crisis over the 
period we examine, we allow for a structural break in the unit root and cointegration tests. 
While the focus is on the relationship between  real estate and stock markets , employing 
bivariate analysis is not satisfactory because the relationship between the variables might be 
spurious reflecting common factors (Quan & Titman, 1999; Ibrahim, 2010). This suggests 
that other control variables need to be added. We use the interest rate, which is likely to be a 
key determinant of an  investor‟s  ability  to  borrow  to  finance  investment  in  the  housing 
market  and  stock  market  (Chen,  2001).  The  availability  of  credit  has  been  shown  to  be 
important in reinforcing boom-bust cycles in asset markets (see Oikarinen, 2009). 
 
Data 
The sample consists of daily data on 13 REITs, the KLCI and the interbank deposit rates 
(proxy for interest rate) for the period from 3 January 2006 to 31 March 2009. We have data 
on 13 REITs as follows: Amanah Harta Tanah PNB 1 (AHP1), Amanah Harta Tanah PNB 2 
(AHP2), AmFIRST (AMFIRST), Al-‟Aqar KPJ (ALAQAR), ATRIUM, AMANAHRAYA 
(ARREIT),  Axis  Real  Estate  Investment  Trust  (AXREIT),  Al-Hadharah  Boustead 
                                                           
5 http://www.theedgeproperty.com/research/2459-reits-around-asia-2h2009.html (last accessed 19 July, 2010). 
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(BSDREIT),  HEKTAR,  Quill  Capita  Trust  (QCAPITA),  Starhill  Real  Estate  Investment 
Trust (STARREIT), Tower Real Estate Investment Trust (TWRREIT) and UOA Real Estate 
Investment Trust (UOA REIT).  Most of these REITs have investments predominantly, or 
exclusively, in Malaysian commercial real estate. Exceptions are ALAQAR with investments 
in  hospitals  in  Bangladesh,  Indonesia  and  Malaysia  and  BSDREIT,  which  is  an  Islamic 
plantation-based REIT. AHP1 and AHP2 were listed in 1989 and 1990 respectively, while 
the others have been listed since 2005. For the purposes of this study, the 13 REITs have 
different starting dates as follows: Group 1: 3/1/2006 - AHP1, AHP2, AXREIT, STARREIT, 
UOAREIT; Group 2: 12/4/2006 – TWRREIT; Group 3: 10/8/2006 – ALAQAR; Group 4: 
4/12/2006 – HEKTAR; Group 5: 21/12/2006 – AMFIRST; Group 6: 8/1/2007 – QCAPITA; 
Group 7: 8/2/2007 – BSDREIT; Group 8: 26/2/2007 – ARREIT; and Group 9: 2/4/2007 – 
ATRIUM.  The time span on all the series is dictated by data availability. Table 1 displays 
the summary descriptive statistics for the interest rate, KLCI and 13 REITs. Only two out of 
the 13 REITs showed positive returns during the sample period. AHP2 has the highest return 
while ATRIUM has the lowest. Most of the REITs exhibit negative skewness. Each of the 
Jarque-Bera  statistics  are  statistically  significant,  meaning  that  all  of  the  series  are  not 
normally distributed, which is a common feature of financial data. 
Methodology 
Order of Integration of the Variables 
All data were transformed to natural logarithms before the analysis. Although the REITs have 
different starting dates, the number of observations for each REIT is more than 500 which is 
sufficiently long for the unit root analysis. We begin with testing the order of integration of 
the variables. We first applied the standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests. 
Perron (1989) showed that the power to reject the null of a unit root decreases when the 
stationary alternative is true and a structural break is ignored. Hence, to further examine the 8 
 
stationarity properties of the data for each series, we employ the lagrange multiplier (LM) 
unit root test with one structural break proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003). In contrast to 
the Perron (1989) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) ADF-type unit root tests, the LM unit root 
test has the major advantage that its statistical properties are unaffected by the existence of a 
structural break under the null hypothesis (see Lee and Strazicich, 2003). 
 
The LM unit root test can be explained with the following data generating process (DGP):
t t t y Z e   ,  1 t t t ee    .  Here,  t Z   consists  of  exogenous  variables  and  t  is  an  error 
term with classical properties. Lee and Strazicich (2003) developed two versions of the LM 
unit root test with one structural break. Using the same nomenclature as employed by Perron 
(1989), Model A is known as the „crash‟ model, and allows for a one-time change in the 
intercept under the alternative hypothesis. Model A can be described by  
'
1, , tt Z t D  , where 
1 t D   for  1, B tT   and zero otherwise; TB is the date of the structural break, and δ' = (δ1, 
δ2, δ3). Model C, the „crash-cum-growth‟ model, allows for a shift in the intercept and a 
change  in  the  trend  slope  under  the  alternative  hypothesis.  It  can  be  described  by
 
'
1, , , t t t Z t D DT  , where  tB DT t T   for  1, B tT   and zero otherwise. 
 
The  LM  unit  root  test  statistic  is  obtained  from  the  regression:  t t t t S Z y          1 , 
where  t t x t t ˆ Z ˆ y S      ,  T ,..., t 2  ;  ˆ  are coefficients in the regression of  t y  on  t Z  ; 
x ˆ   is given by   t t Z y  ; and  1 y  and  1 Z  represent  the  first  observations  of  t y  and  t Z  
respectively. The LM test statistic, , is given by the t-statistic for testing the unit root null 
hypothesis that  0   . The location of the structural break   B T  is determined by selecting all 9 
 
possible  break  points  for  the  minimum  t-statistic  as  follows:      i inf inf

     ,  where 
T TB   . The search is carried out over the trimming region (0.15T, 0.85T), where T is 
sample size. To select the lag length, we used the general to specific procedure proposed by 
Hall (1994). We set the maximum number of lags equal to eight and used the 10 per cent 
asymptotic normal value of 1.645 to ascertain  the statistical significance of the last first-
differenced  lagged  term.  After  deciding  the  optimal  lag  length  for  each  breakpoint,  we 
ascertained the break where the endogenous LM statistic is at a minimum. Critical values for 
the LM unit root test with one structural break are tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003). 
 
Cointegration 
Once the order of integration of each of the variables is ascertained, we proceed to test for 
cointegration. The existence of cointegration would imply that even though each individual 
series is non-stationary, one or more linear combinations of them are stationary. 
 
The long-run multivariate model estimated for each REIT is as follows: 
12 ln ln ln t t t t REIT IR SP                     (1) 
where  ln ,ln REIT IRand  lnSPare  the  natural  logs  of  the  REIT,  interest  rate  and  KPCI 
respectively, while the   term is the serially independent random error with mean zero and 
finite covariance matrix. This equation is used to test whether the REIT, interest rate and 
KLCI  are  cointegrated.  Gregory  and  Hansen  (1996)  proposed  three  models  for  t esting 
cointegration where there is a structural break in the cointegrating vector. 
 
The first contains a level shift (Model C): 
1 2 1 2 ln ln ln t t t t t REIT D IR SP
           ,  1,..., tn          (2) 10 
 
The second model contains a level shift and trend (Model C/T): 
1 2 0 1 2 ln ln ln t t t t t REIT D t IR SP
               ,  1,..., tn        (3) 
Here  0 t D
   for t    and  1 t D
   for t   . The intercept before the level shift is denoted as 
1  , while  2   is the change in intercept due to the level shift. 
The third model allows for a regime shift (Model C/S):  
1 2 0 1 2
34
ln ln ln
                  ln ln , 1,...,
t t t t
t t t t t
REIT D t IR SP
IR D SPD t n
  
   
    
  
    
   
        (4) 
Here,  1  and  2   are as in Equations 2 and 3.  1
   and  2
  denotes the cointegrating slope 
coefficient before the regime shift; and  3
   and  4
   denote the change in the slope coefficient. 
In order to test for cointegration between REITt and IRt and SPt with structural change, i.e. the 
stationarity of  t   in Equations 2–4, Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose a suite of tests. 
These statistics are the commonly used ADF statistics and extensions of the  Z  and  t Z  test 





   
 
* inf
T ZZ   
   
 
* inf tt T ZZ
 
   
As the break point,, is unknown a priori, the model is estimated recursively allowing the 
break point to vary between (0.15T, 0.85T), where T is the sample size. The null hypothesis 
of no cointegration is examined using the three statistics with interest in the smallest values 
for the three statistics across all break points required to reject the null. 
 
Granger Causality 11 
 
Once it is established whether or not there is a long-run relationship between the series, we 
test whether there is Granger causality between interest rates, REITs and stock prices. If 
interest rates, REITs and stock prices are cointegrated, an error correction term should be 
included in the multivariate autoregression model as follows (Granger, 1988) 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
ln ln ln ln
k k k
t i t i i t i i t i t t
i i i
REIT REIT IR SP ECT          
  
              
2 2 2 2 1
1 1 1
ln ln ln ln
k k k
t i t i i t i i t i t t
i i i
IR REIT IR SP ECT          
  
              
3 3 3 3 1
1 1 1
ln ln ln ln
k k k
t i t i i t i i t i t t
i i i
SP REIT IR SP ECT          
  
              
   
where Δ is the first difference, ECT is the error correction term derived from Equation (1) 
and all variables are as defined above. The VECM combines the long-run information as well 
as their short-run dynamics; specifically, the lagged error correction term depicts long-run 
causality while the lagged first difference variables depict short-run causality.  
 
To illustrate the difference between short-run and long-run Granger causality assume that 
there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between stock prices and REITs, stock prices 
Granger cause REITs and a shock occurs that changes stock prices. The shock will affect the 
dynamic  path  of  REITs  in  two  ways.  First  there  is  a  short-run  transitory  impact  that  is 
captured  by  the  coefficients  on  REITs.  Second,  there  is  then  a  further  long-run  impact 
through the error correction term operating to restore the long run equilibrium. This long-run 
impact is absent in the case when only the short-run causality is present. If we have only 
short-run causality a  change in  stock prices  Granger  causes only a short  term  change in 
REITs. However, if we have both short-run and long-run causality two impacts operate, the 
short term impact, and a long term impact as equilibrium between the variables is restored. 12 
 
 
The  presence  of  long-run  causality  is  based  on  the  significance  of  the  error-correction 
coefficient using the standard t test. We apply standard F-tests to the k lagged coefficients of 
each variable to make Granger causal inferences. In particular, we test the hypotheses below: 
01 11 12 1 : ... 0 k H         for the pairwise causality relationship running from IR to REIT. 
02 11 12 1 : ... 0 k H         for the pairwise causality relationship running from REIT to IR. 
There  are  four  alternative  causality  relationships  from  the  hypotheses  above. First,  if  we 
reject H01 but do not reject H02, this implies Granger causality is running from IR to REIT. 
Second, if we do not reject H01 but reject H02 this implies that Granger causality is running 
from REIT to IR. Third, if we reject both H01 and H02 this means that there is a feedback 
effect between REIT and IR. Fourth, if we do not reject H01 or H02, this means that REIT and 
IR are independent. The same explanation can be applied for the other pair of variables. 
 
Results 
The results of the ADF test are reported in Table 2. AHP2, ALAQAR and QCAPITA are 
integrated of order zero (I(0)) with constant and trend included; however, they do not reject 
the null of a unit root if the series are tested without constant and trend. The other nine series 
are  each  integrated  of  order  one  (I(1)).  The  results  for  the  LM  unit  root  test  with  one 
structural break are presented in Tables 3 and 4. In Model A, we find that the unit root null 
for AHP2 and ARREIT is rejected at the 5 per cent level and in Model C the unit root null for 
AHP2 is again rejected at the 5 per cent level. All other series are (I(1)) at the per cent level 
or better for both models. In Model A, the break in the intercept is statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level or better for each of the variables except the interest rate. In Model C, 
except for HEKTAR and UOAREIT, the break in the intercept and/or slope is statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level or better in each case. The breakpoints for the REITs mostly 13 
 
coincide with the worst months of the subprime crisis in July to September, 2008. In Model 
A, the breakpoint for KLCI is on the next Monday after the twelfth General Election which is 
often described as a „political tsunami‟ in Malaysia, in which the ruling Barisan National 
Party lost government in five states and its two-third majority in the Parliament.  
 
The results of the Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration test with a structural break are 
presented in Table 5. There are a range of break points across the test statistics and models, 
but  almost  all  coincide  with  the  subprime  mortgage  crisis.  We  find  strong  evidence  of 
cointegration between the REIT, interest rate and stock index for most of the REIT except 
AXREIT, ATRIUM and STARREIT. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected 
with any of the test statistics for any of the three models (C, C/T, C/S) for AXREIT. For 
ATRIUM, the null hypothesis is rejected with 
*
t Z  for model C/T at the 10 per cent level. For 
STARREIT, the null hypothesis is rejected for model C/T with the three test statistics. 
 
Table 6 presents the Granger causality results. For 12 of the 13 REITs we include an error-
correction term. For AXREIT, we only test for short-run Granger causality. Beginning with 
the short run, there is no short run Granger causality between IR and the other two variables 
except for BSDREIT, for which Granger causality is running one way from REIT to IR. At 
the 5 per cent level or better there is unidirectional Granger causality in the short run running 
from SP to REIT, consistent with a wealth effect, for AHP1, AHP2, AMFIRST, AXREIT, 
QCAPITA,  STARREIT,  TWRREIT  and  UOAREIT.  For  ALAQAR,  BSDREIT  and 
HEKTAR, REIT and SP are independent in the short run. Turning to the long-run, for six 
REITs (AHP2, AMFIRST, ATRIUM, QCAPITA, STARREIT, UOAREIT) there is long-run 
Granger causality running from REIT and SP to IR. There is strong support for the wealth 14 
 
effect.  For  five  REITs  (ATRIUM,  BSDREIT,  HEKTAR,  TWRREIT,  UOAREIT) 
unidirectional Granger causality runs from IR and SP to REIT at the 5 per cent level or better 
in the long run, consistent with the wealth effect.  For four REITs (AHP1, AHP2, ALAQAR, 
ARREIT), there is bidirectional Granger causality between REIT and SP at the 5 per cent 
level or better in the long run. The feedback effect is consistent with both a wealth effect and 
a credit-price effect and can be a potential explanation of spiralling upturns of both prices. 
For three REITs (AMFIRST, QCAPITA, STARREIT), IR and SP are independent, meaning 
that  the  two  markets  are  segmented  in  the  long-run.  For  those  cases  where  the  error-
correction  term  is  significant,  given  deviations  from  long-run  equilibrium,  the  speed  of 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is faster for REITs than SP.  
 
Conclusion 
The main finding is this paper that for some REITs there is a wealth effect and for others 
there  is  a  feedback  effect,  consistent  with  a  spiralling  upturn  in  both  housing  and  stock 
markets, lends credence to concerns that the Malaysian real estate market is characterized by 
an asset bubble and that a decline in the stock market could burst the Malaysian real estate 
bubble. Such an explanation places the stock market centre stage and suggests that the stock 
market is crucial for stability in the real estate market. This result is similar to Ibrahim‟s 
(2010) findings for Thailand. He argued that the burst in the Thai housing market following 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 was a result of declining stock markets. The result is 
also  consistent  with  the  findings  of  other  studies  that  the  stock  market  Granger  causes 
economic growth in Malaysia (see eg. Mun et al., 2008). The policy implication of finding 
widespread evidence of a wealth effect is that policymakers should implement policies to 
promote stability in the stock market. Following the Asian financial crisis, the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange and Securities Commission put in place a series of standards designed to 15 
 
improve transparency, disclosure, accounting and corporate governance, but these standards 
still fall short of international standards (Shimomoto, 1999).   As it stands, for most of the 
period studied there has been a positive wealth effect, reinforced by a positive credit-price 
effect, in the Malaysian asset market. As a result the real estate and stock markets have had 
positive feedback effects on each other. But, if stock markets were to decline, a negative 
wealth effect would have a large negative impact on the real estate market and this would 
then feedback to the stock market creating a downward spiral in prices. 
 
One of the limitations of this study is that the sample is constrained due to the availability of 
data on REITs. REITs are still an embryonic form of investment in Malaysia and, as such, 
may not be a very good proxy for investment in real estate. Further research is needed for 
other Asian markets, such as Singapore, in which REITs are more established.  A second 
potential limitation is that we have looked at the relationship between investment in real 
estate, proxied by the REITs, and the stock market for Malaysia as a whole. If consistent data 
in housing prices in „property hot spots‟ such as Kuala Lumpur, the Klang Valley and Penang 
were  to  become  available,  future  research  could  examine  if  there  are  differences  in  the 
dynamic linkages between real estate and stocks between geographical areas with different 
price levels. As pointed out by Green (2002) and Kapopoulos and Siokis (2005), a more 
expensive housing market could be a prime candidate for the wealth effect to be large. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Series  Mean  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  n 
Interest Rate  3.376478  0.312774  -3.20251  13.06543  5017.387  846 
KLCI  1119.53  194.559  0.174121  1.522888  81.18542  846 
AHP1  110.8045  8.850188  0.244806  1.804574  58.82393  846 
AHP2  117.0304  11.65211  0.236375  2.613118  13.15429  846 
ALAQAR  95.50557  5.673908  -1.04978  3.390093  130.9193  689 
AMFIRST  99.72768  5.451265  -0.36957  3.301087  15.76542  594 
ARREIT  92.58428  6.492529  -1.64153  4.841701  322.9661  547 
ATRIUM  93.57565  16.23328  -0.45463  1.842493  47.12328  522 
AXREIT  96.39578  13.28555  -0.63423  4.071186  97.16423  846 
BSDREIT  110.5848  13.31546  -0.05599  1.730429  37.83382  559 
HEKTAR  116.8389  25.16724  -0.16963  1.623914  50.80348  607 
QCAPITA  124.3234  28.60912  0.683746  2.799889  46.31935  582 
STARREIT  90.91726  8.736932  -0.14522  2.640069  7.540312  846 
TWRREIT  102.7857  18.23294  0.544356  1.854855  80.62105  775 
UOAREIT  97.85946  11.44492  0.278515  2.251751  30.67311  846 
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Table 2: ADF unit root test 
series  level    First difference   
  lag  t-statistic  lag  t-statistic 
Interest Rate  0  0.673320  0  -29.38520
*** 
KLCI  1  -0.574735  0  -26.10894
*** 
AHP1  5  -1.718209  4  -18.43804
*** 
AHP2  2  -3.965816
**  1  -26.18868
*** 
ALAQAR  1  -3.662181
**  1  -22.94522
*** 
AMFIRST  1  -3.020460  0  -33.58209
*** 
ARREIT  4  -1.295491  3  -16.95810
*** 
ATRIUM  2  -2.295732  1  -21.81740
*** 
AXREIT  0  -1.519717  0  -29.52673
*** 
BSDREIT  0  -1.984224  0  -25.80888
*** 
HEKTAR  2  -1.444554  1  -22.56293
*** 
QCAPITA  2  -4.912277
***  1  -19.80769
*** 
STARREIT  2  -1.741549  1  -24.38664
*** 
TWRREIT  0  -1.219509  0  -30.42831
*** 
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Table 3: LS test Model A with a Structural Break   
  TB  k  St-1  1  Bt 
Interest rate (IR)  29/8/06  0  -0.0044                  
(-1.3619) 
0.0009                   
(0.7859) 
0.0143                   
(1.1196) 







































































***   
(-6.4640) 





























Notes: Critical values for the LM test at 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels = -3.211, -3.566, -4.239. 
Critical values for other coefficients based on standard t distribution = 1.645, 1.96, 2.576. 
* (
**) 








Table 4: LS test Model C with a Structural Break 
  TB  k  St-1  1  Bt  Dt 
Interest rate  3/10/08  0  -0.0309                  
(-3.6410)                
0.0022
***                   
(3.0273)                
0.0048                   
(0.3770)                
-0.0041
***                  
(-3.3238) 








































































































































location of break, λ  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5 
1% significant level  -5.11  -5.07  -5.15  -5.05  -5.11 
5% significant level  -4.50  -4.47  -4.45  -4.50  -4.51 
10% significant level  -4.21  -4.20  -4.18  -4.18  -4.17 
Notes: The critical values are symmetric around λ and (1-λ).  
* (
**) 











Table 5: Gregory and Hansen Test for Cointegration with a Structural Break 
Series  Model  ADF
*  k  TB  Z
*
t  TB  Z
*
α  TB 
AHP1  C  -4.8180
*  5  14/5/07  -8.2939
***  10/5/07  -123.24
***  10/5/07 
  C/T  -4.8099  5  14/5/07  -8.2835
***  10/5/07  -122.91
***  10/5/07 
  C/S  -4.8701  5  14/5/07  -8.5373
***  25/5/07  -129.97
***  25/5/07 
AHP2  C  -6.3427
***  1  28/6/07  -7.3158
***  29/6/07  -96.945
***  29/6/07 
  C/T  -6.8613
***  1  28/6/07  -8.0226
***  29/6/07  -115.58
***  29/6/07 
  C/S  -7.1022
***  1  2/7/07  -8.2612
***  29/6/07  -121.85
***  29/6/07 
ALAQAR  C  -5.5448
***  1  14/8/08  -6.6858
***  18/1/07  -82.138
***  18/1/07 
  C/T  -4.6401  7  18/8/08  -7.0120
***  28/5/07  -89.663
***  28/5/07 
  C/S  -4.7053  2  3/9/08  -7.1211
***  24/4/08  -92.796
***  24/4/08 
AMFIRST  C  -4.3818  1  15/10/07  -4.9745
**  15/10/07  -45.412
*  15/10/07 
  C/T  -5.0442
*  1  15/10/07  -5.7239
**  15/10/07  -58.693
**  15/10/07 
  C/S  -4.6002  1  15/10/07  -5.1794  15/10/07  -48.797  15/10/07 
ARREIT  C  -5.6323
***      2  20/11/08  -8.9005
***  5/12/08  -129.89
***  5/12/08 
  C/T  -8.2592
***  1  5/12/08  -10.918
***  5/12/08  -183.47
***  5/12/08 
  C/S  -6.2615
***  1  13/6/08  -9.2745
***  14/11/08  -140.29
***  14/11/08 
ATRIUM  C  -3.4089  6  15/11/07  -3.6980  20/11/07  -25.807  20/11/07 
  C/T  -3.9539  2  19/7/07  -5.0385
*  18/7/07  -45.984  18/7/07 
  C/S  -3.8646  4  7/3/08  -4.7916  19/3/08  -40.033  19/3/08 
AXREIT  C  -3.6944  0  3/10/08  -3.6833  3/10/08  -26.425  3/10/08 
  C/T  -3.5232  0  3/10/08  -3.4946  3/10/08  -24.104  3/10/08 
  C/S  -3.6655  0  17/9/08  -3.6452  17/9/08  -25.998  17/9/08 
BSDREIT  C  -5.1380
**  0  1/2/08  -5.1540
**  23/1/08  -49.970
**  23/1/08 
  C/T  -6.6221
***  0  30/7/08  -6.4902
***  30/7/08  -77.946
***  30/7/08 
  C/S  -5.3910
*  0  12/2/08  -5.4875
*  5/3/08  -56.412
*  5/3/08 
HEKTAR  C  -4.3565  8  7/6/07  -4.8651
*  15/6/07  -43.046
*  15/6/07 
  C/T  -4.8063  1  15/6/07  -5.1587
*  15/6/07  -49.197
*  15/6/07 
  C/S  -4.6405  1  8/5/07  -5.1249  24/5/07  -48.693  24/5/07 
QCAPITA  C  -5.5432
***  6  3/9/07  -5.2905
**  4/9/07  -43.565
*  4/9/07 
  C/T  -5.5237
**  6  3/9/07  -5.4713
**  10/9/07  -50.732
*  10/9/07 
  C/S  -6.2054
***  0  13/9/07  -6.1470
***  10/9/07  -69.731
***  10/9/07 
STARREIT  C  -3.5956  7  28/8/07  -3.5568  3/9/07  -23.469  3/9/07 
  C/T  -5.3217
**  0  8/2/07  -5.2367
*  7/2/07  -53.010
*  7/2/07 
  C/S  -4.2759  1  4/9/07  -4.4824  3/9/07  -39.106  3/9/07 
TWRREIT  C  -3.8480  1  2/7/07  -3.8723  2/7/07  -24.627  28/6/07 
  C/T  -6.0021
***  0  10/7/07  -5.8067
***  10/7/07  -62.395
**  10/7/07 
  C/S  -5.6722
**  0  29/6/07  -5.6416
**  18/6/07  -60.936
**  18/6/07 
UOAREIT  C  -4.3773  2  12/9/06  -5.1082
**  13/9/06  -49.583
**  13/9/06 
  C/T  -8.3552
***  0  13/6/07  -8.5224
***  19/6/07  -132.49
***  19/6/07 
  C/S  -6.6004
***  0  11/6/07  -6.4981
***  7/6/07  -80.187




***) denotes statistical significance at the 10(5)(1)% level. 







Model  1%  5%  10%  1%  5%  10% 
C  -5.44  -4.92  -4.69  -57.01  -46.98  -42.49 
C/T  -5.80  -5.29  -5.03  -64.77  -53.92  -48.94 
C/S  -5.97  -5.50  -5.23  -68.21  -58.33  -52.85 
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Table 6: Granger Causality Results 
Series    REIT  IR  SP  ECT 
AHP1  REIT  -  2.9781  24.5911
***  -0.0429
*** 
  IR  0.3325  -  1.59221  -0.0065 
  SP  8.3850
*  1.7729  -  -0.0158
** 
AHP2  REIT  -  1.4299  25.2572
***  -0.0344
*** 
  IR  1.711542  -  0.3421  -0.0181
*** 
  SP  5.6295
*  0.4655  -  -0.0129
*** 
ALAQAR  REIT  -  0.9425  2.5558  -0.0314
*** 
  IR  3.4889  -  1.0042  0.0008 
  SP  1.9709  0.4537  -  0.0281
*** 
AMFIRST  REIT  -  3.8135  18.5312
***  -0.0015 
  IR  0.8069  -  1.4970  0.0050
*** 
  SP  0.9044  1.2722  -  -0.0002 
ARREIT  REIT  -  3.1866  0.0791  -0.1413
*** 
  IR  0.1215  -  0.9365  0.0159 
  SP  1.0825  0.2855  -  -0.0385
*** 
ATRIUM  REIT  -  1.4615  1.5470  -0.0069
** 
  IR  0.8751  -  0.2651  -0.0066
*** 
  SP  4.4600  0.5323  -  -0.0010 
AXREIT  REIT  -  3.4774  10.1655
***  - 
  IR  0.0994  -  0.9989  - 
  SP  2.6611  0.5296  -  - 
BSDREIT  REIT  -  0.0393  1.4161  -0.0207
*** 
  IR  4.9025
**  -  0.1221  -0.0104 
  SP  1.7600  0.4085  -  -0.0050 
HEKTAR  REIT  -  2.2835  0.0711  -0.0293
*** 
  IR  0.1768  -  0.3506  -0.0048 
  SP  2.2923  0.6486  -  -0.0016 
QCAPITA  REIT  -  0.4528  5.6784
**  -0.0005 
  IR  0.0068  -  0.0027  -0.0019
*** 
  SP  0.6271  0.5096  -  -0.0000 
STARREIT  REIT  -  0.6878  11.4901
***  -0.0033 
  IR  1.2098  -  1.7546  0.0153
*** 
  SP  1.8638  1.8440  -  0.0003 
TWRREIT  REIT  -  0.5764  13.8574
***  -0.0187
*** 
  IR  0.9241  -  0.6160  -0.0022 
  SP  1.9347  0.6072  -  -0.0056
* 
UOAREIT  REIT  -  0.7670  12.4154
**  -0.0196
** 
  IR  1.8287  -  3.0484  0.0158
** 




*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 